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The less well-paid you are when you enter the labour market,
the more your degree will now cost
Ron Johnston argues that much of the debate on tuition fees is misleading. Not only is the
size of the debt incurred by students persistently understated but the repayment system is
itself regressive. The greater your rewards from studying for a degree the less you pay for
the opportunity. This has profound consequences for postgraduate education and
recruitment to the professions. 
On 6 January 2013 The Independent on Sunday reported that a number of  UK university
vice-chancellors and other senior academics had expressed great concern about the
absence of  f inancial support f or, and thus problems of  recruitment to, taught masters’ courses – many
of  which provide necessary training f or a range of  (mainly) public-sector prof essions rather than
introductions to f undamental research. On the same day, The Observer carried a major article by Will
Hutton (Principal of  Hertf ord College, Oxf ord) on that issue, rightly associating those dif f icult ies with the
amount of  debt students will have accumulated at the end of  their undergraduate degrees. Unf ortunately,
like so many  others, he did not f ully address the nature and extent of  such debts, nor the misleading
representations of  the repayment system f rom both the polit icians who implemented it and many
subsequent commentators.
The details needed to make a f ull assessment are readily available f rom the ‘student loans repayment
calculator ’ on a government website. Although it makes some pragmatic assumptions, such as at what
rate individuals’ post-graduation incomes increases and f uture rates of  inf lation, the inf ormation
provided is suf f icient to generate a clear conclusion: the extent of  the debts students graduating f rom
2015  onwards will be carrying is not only of ten understated but in addition the repayment system is
regressive according to income and not progressive, as f requently claimed.
Take, f or example, a student who reads f or a three-year degree at a f ee of  £9,000 per annum, but does
not take up the available maintenance loans. Because interest is charged during the three years of  study
at the rate of  inf lation (RPI – assumed to be 3.6%) plus 3%, the debt on graduation is not £27,000 but
£30,723. Repayments only commence when the graduate earns more than £21,000 per annum, and are at
the f lat rate of  9% of  the dif f erence between gross income and £21,000 – so that someone earning
£25,000 repays 9% on £4,000.
The smaller the amount that you earn, the less you pay in any one year, but as you continue to be
charged interest on the outstanding amount (at the rate of  inf lation if  you earn £21,000; at the rate of
inf lation plus up to 3% depending on your income if  you earn £21-41,000; and by the rate of  inf lation
plus 3% if  you earn more than £41,000) the size of  your debt continues to increase – f or nine years if
your starting income was £21,000. As a consequence our student whose course f ees were £27,000 will
take 23 years and 4 months to pay of f  the loan, at a total cost of  £67,743.
The larger your starting salary above a threshold, however, the less you pay back in total – and in a
shorter t ime. According to the ‘student loans repayment calculator ’, somebody who ‘borrowed’ £27,000
f or the f ees and whose starting salary is £25,000 repays a total of  £57,526 over 17 years and 8 months;
with a starting salary of  £30,000, the repayment period is 13 years, 9 months and the total repaid is
£50,943; and f or a starting salary of  £40,000, only £44,354 is repaid – over a period of  just 9 years and
9 months. The conclusion is clear: the less well-paid you are when you enter the labour market, the more
your degree costs, both relatively and absolutely – and not the other way round.
David Willetts and others have claimed that the repayment system is, in ef f ect, better than a graduate
tax: on page 18 of  BIS’s June 2011 White Paper Students at the Heart of the System, f or example, we are
told that the proposed system of  graduate contributions ‘preserves a caref ul balance between the
interests of  higher and lower earners, by requiring higher earners to make a f air contribution to the costs
of  the system as a whole’ and that because ‘all graduates will pay less per month than under the old
system, … higher education [will be made] more af f ordable f or everyone’! Furthermore, the better-paid
(and those f rom wealthier backgrounds) can pay of f  their debt immediately on graduation, at no cost – a
f urther regressive element to the system; or they can pay the f ull f ees upf ront.
All this is built on assumptions regarding not only the rate of  inf lation (the higher it is, the larger your
debt) but also increases in the graduate’s income over t ime, plus any change in the repayment threshold.
A graduate with a starting salary of  £21,000 is assumed to be earning £41,000 thirteen years later, with
increases of  up to 15% in the early years, f alling to about 5%. (The source f or the government website’s
calculations is an Of f ice f or National Statistics analysis of  Labour Force Survey data) If  income grows
more slowly, the debt accumulates even more, the repayment period is longer, and the total repaid also
increases – which again disadvantages the lower-paid. Another website  allows f urther experimentation
with varying rates of  salary increase and inf lation; the conclusions developed here do not change, only
the inf lexion point in the graphs discussed below.
These calculations all assume that the student doesn’t take out a maintenance loan – a maximum of
£7,675 per annum f or those living away f rom home and studying in London. If  you also take out that loan
f or three years (and do not qualif y f or any support because of  low parental income), the government’s
calculations show that f or graduates with a starting salary of  £21,000 the init ial debt is £56,924 (not the
£50,025 ‘borrowed’). It grows until the 26th year of  continuous earning (when it stands at £101,976);
repayments stop af ter 30 years (af ter which any remaining debt is wiped), by when the f ull sum remitted
has been £114,418. Someone whose starting salary is £30,000 has a peak debt of  £67,457 af ter 10
years; the f ull amount is paid of f  af ter 23 years and 9 months, with the total costs of  the package being
£135,914. And the graduate with a starting salary of  £40,000 makes repayments totalling just £104,105
(23% less than that f or the person whose starting salary is £10,000 lower), completing the process in
only 16 years and one month.
Those whose starting salaries are low are protected, theref ore. The government assumes a minimum
income once the graduate enters the labour f orce of  £15,795: somebody earning that amount who takes
out loans f or both f ees (£9,000) and maintenance (£7,675) repays £56,041 over 30 years, by which point
the amount owed has increased f rom the init ial sum of  £56,924 to £136,304 – when it is wiped out. The
system is progressive in its impact f or those with the lowest starting salaries, theref ore, but above
£21,000 it becomes regressive because of  the single ‘tax rate’ (and despite the link between income and
a varying interest rate on the accumulating debt): so, the greater your rewards from studying for a
degree the less you pay for the opportunity (or, as the Institute of  Fiscal Studies concluded in its 2010
evaluation of  the government’s proposals: the scheme ‘does benef it poor students, [but] it does not
benef it poor graduates’).
The graph above shows just how large the dif f erences are, especially f or students who take out loans
not only f or f ees but also f or the maintenance grant: it contrasts a student who has a f ees-only loan f or
three years and another who in addition takes out the maximum maintenance loan f or studying in
London. Starting incomes f rom £16,000 to £44,000 are shown; all of  the data are taken f rom the
‘student loans repayment calculator ’. If  a student takes out a f ees-only loan, then the total amount
repaid f alls once the starting income exceeds £18,000. For the student studying in London who also
takes out a maintenance loan, the amount repaid increases with the starting salary until that reaches
£26,000, and then begins to f all; somebody with a starting salary of  £44,000 pays back less f or the
same amount ‘borrowed’ (£50,025) than somebody with a starting salary just above £20,000.
No wonder that Vice-Chancellors are worried about the f uture market f or postgraduate masters’
degrees. Even if  loans were available f or those courses, how many students would avail themselves of
such opportunit ies, given the debts they are carrying f rom their undergraduate education – especially if
they want to work in the relatively poorly-paid prof essions like social work? Society as a whole should
share their concern – where are the next generations of  entrants to many of  our (under-rewarded)
prof essions to come f rom given this unf air burden?
(With many thanks to Rich Harris, Kelvyn Jones, Dan Lunt, David Manley and Ed Thomas for illuminating
discussions of these issues.)
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the British Politics and Policy blog, nor
of the London School of Economics. Please read our comments policy before posting.
About the Author
Ron Johnston is Professor of Geography in the School of Geographical Sciences at the University of
Bristol. His academic work has focused on political geography (especially electoral studies), urban
geography, and the history of human geography. 
You may also be interested in the following posts (automatically generated):
1. The government’s plans to place a levy on early student loan repayments will change litt le and add
an unnecessary layer of  complexity to the system (19.1)
2. Ef f orts to strengthen and promote the role of  universit ies in the UK of ten ignore the European
dimension, to their cost (15.2)
3. Book Review: Creating the Market University: How Academic Science Became an Economic Engine
by Elizabeth Popp Berman (13.6)
4. The Research Excellence Framework is lumbering and expensive. For a f raction of  the cost, a
digital census of  academic research would create unrivalled and genuine inf ormation about UK
universit ies’ research perf ormance (13.2)
